By Jared Chausow
By Katie Toth
By Elizabeth Flock
By Albert Samaha
By Anna Merlan
By Jon Campbell
By Jon Campbell
By Albert Samaha
Cheney was then the Secretary of Defense for the first President Bush, and Kerry, then as now a U.S. senator from Massachusetts, had been named to head the specially created Senate Select Committee on P.O.W.M.I.A. Affairs. The committee's life ran for nearly a year and a halffrom August 1991 to January 1993, when its final report was issued.
It was a voluminous, 1,223-page tome that said, in its brief executive summary, that beyond the 591 men returned in 1973 after the Nixon administration signed its peace treaty with Hanoi, "a small number" may still have been held in captivity, but that there was "no compelling evidence that proves" any of these men were still alive in 1993. Evidence but not compelling enough. Evidence but no proof. The summary read like a pinch-minded legal brief.
Amazingly, the 1,000-plus pages of the body of the report repeatedly challenged the summary, spelling out in detail instance after instance of stark evidence that Hanoi had held back not "a small number" but a very sizable contingent of American prisoners, probably for a ransom that never came. Documents unearthed by the committee staff put the number in the hundreds, maybe as many as 700.
Kerry's collaboration with Cheney was not something that took place in public. They didn't appear together or hold joint press conferences. Mostly, Cheney kept out of sight. Nonetheless, the two of them were working closely together. In effect, Kerry made the Department of Defense a virtual partner in the probe.
For example, Kerry had his top aide, committee chief of staff Frances Zwenig, specifically coordinate and orchestrate the panel's public hearings with Defense Department officialseven though the Defense Department was supposed to be the main agency under investigation for covering up the existence of the prisoners.
In a memorandum for the record, one staffer protested: "Speaking for the other investigators, I can say we are sick and tired of this investigation being controlled by those we are supposedly investigating."
When committee staffers complained that the Pentagon was withholding pivotal P.O.W. documents, Cheney in response wrote a letter to his subordinates telling them to give the committee everything it wanted. It was a wink-wink letter. The stonewalling continued right up to the committee's expiration. The Pentagon never turned over the key documents. Kerry, afterward, said the Pentagon's cooperation had been exemplary.
As the panel's final report was being written, the lobbying by interested parties was intense. The Pentagon was the heaviest lobbyist, and it had an inside track to Kerry. It was chief of staff Zwenig who, on Kerry's instructions, personally shepherded the Pentagon's alterations into the report. None of these insertions was identified as coming from the Pentagon. Anyone reading those passages would assume the committee had written them.
Cheney's motives were obvious. He and the first President Bushand all the other presidents since Nixonhave continued the cover-up, realizing the political immensity of leaving these men behind and afraid of the public firestorm that would ensue if they revealed the truth. Powerful reputations and governments have fallen for far less serious wrongs. So, across seven presidencies and 31 years, official Washington has insisted on this inglorious national "secret."
Sadly, the mainstream press, with few exceptions, has gone along with the government's story, rarely digging beneath the surface. They, like most Americans, were anxious to bury the Vietnam experience.
Kerry's motives for burying the truth largely remain a mystery. All one can tell from the record is that at some point fairly early in the committee's life, he began talking about the importance of putting the war behind us and normalizing relations with Vietnam, and it became clear that he was sweeping the scandal out of sight.
Kerry has consistently denied any cover-up, insisting that he had conducted the most exhaustive investigation of missing soldiers in the history of warfare.
I have been researching and writing about this story for a dozen years, roughly from the start-up of the Kerry committeea time when I was optimistic that this decorated Vietnam veteran was going to go for the truth. I have asked myself many times why he didn't. I have also pondered what Nixon might have been thinking when he agreed to accept the peace treaty knowing that all the prisoners weren't being returned.
The best explanation I can imagine for Nixon in January 1973 is that in his rush to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War, realizing that Washington had little leverage left at the negotiating table, he told Henry Kissinger to sign the document anyway, possibly thinking that there might be some future way to get the rest of the men back. (The consensus in the intelligence community is that over the years, when it became clear to the Vietnamese that ransom was never going to be paid, Hanoi had most, if not all, of the prisoners executed.)