West Side Stories, cont’d


The West Side Jets stadium may be dead and gone, but the greater Hudson
Yards development project that was to have the stadium as its centerpiece
keeps on lurching fitfully ahead. Tomorrow morning, the city Industrial
Development Agency holds a public hearing on the plan, with a vote by the
IDA board to follow next Tuesday. If all goes according to plan—and the
IDA is just slightly more likely to defy the mayor’s wishes than Donald
Rumsfeld is to ring up the president and tell him to knock off all this
Iraq stuff—the IDA will soon begin selling $3 billion of bonds as part
of Mayor Bloomberg’s mission to seed Manhattan’s Far West Side with office

All of which has budget-watch types just a tad concerned that the only
argument the mayor has marshaled in support of his plan–which would hand
out hundreds in millions of tax breaks to developers and siphon off tax
revenues from a 38-block swath of Manhattan–is a single 20-page
PowerPoint presentation handed out by the Hudson Yards Development
Corporation last week. The bulk of a standing-room-only briefing held
yesterday by the Fiscal Policy Institute, which drew a who’s-who of the
kind of policy geeks who obsess over things like floor-area ratios and
air-rights transfer payments, was spent trying to puzzle out just what’s
in this plan for the city and its taxpayers.

Making sense of the Hudson Yards financing plan alone seemingly requires
the aid of a trained economist, or maybe Rube Goldberg. It goes something
like this: The city exempts developers from paying property taxes, instead
having them direct payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) to the new Hudson
Yards Infrastructure Corporation. (This is different from the
project-managing HYDC, which mustn’t sully its hands with money.) The HYIC
would use the cash to repay the $3 billion in bonds, which would mostly be
used to extend the #7 subway line across 42nd Street and down 11th Avenue–making it possible for people to get to work at all those new office

Those PILOTs the developers would be paying, though, would be less than
they’d pay in property taxes–anywhere up to 40 percent less, depending on a
brain-numbing formula involving both geography and when a building’s
shovels went in the ground. (The total subsidy, according to the city,
would be around $650 million–though that’s only a guesstimate, as no one
knows what property-tax rates will be like in the year 2035.) The reason,
explains the IDA: Since rents on the Far West Side would be lower than in
Midtown, but construction costs would be just as high, the city needs to
kick in a sweetener to make it profitable to build west of 9th Avenue.

All of which makes sense–until you actually think about it. “The
economic rationale comes down to this page,” James Parrott of the Fiscal
Policy Institute, told the briefing, indicating an HYDC chart comparing
the costs and benefits of building in Midtown vs. the Far West Side, which
left more questions than answers:


  • The whole purpose of Hudson Yards, in the words of one IDA document, is
    to allow “the City of New York to capture its share of the hundreds of
    thousands of new office jobs projected for the region by 2035”–in other
    words, to provide office space for the future corporate throngs who would
    supposedly otherwise be forced to decamp for New Jersey. But if developers
    still have room to build in Midtown, why bother with developing the Far
    West Side? And if Midtown is really filled to capacity, why worry whether
    it would be more profitable for developers to build there?



  • The HYDC document indicates that land costs would be lower in Hudson
    Yards than in Midtown—but still too high for developers to turn a
    profit, which seemingly flies in the face of basic economic rules about
    price-setting, since it hardly makes sense for landholders to demand a
    sale price that they have no hope of getting. The city, as Parrott put it,
    is effectively saying that by extending the #7 line, “we’ve increased the
    value [of the land] to where it’s not economic to build there anymore.”



  • Without explanation, the HYDC chart uses a different “capitalization
    rate”–the return developers would require on their investment–for
    Midtown buildings vs. Hudson Yards ones. Use the lower Midtown figure for
    Hudson Yards, and those too could turn a profit without subsidies, even
    after accounting for lower rents.


All of these concerns are likely to be raised at tomorrow’s hearing; none
are likely to sway the IDA board. The one remaining fly in Bloomberg’s
ointment, then, would be the MTA, which needs to reach an agreement with
the city over just who’s going to pay any overruns on the new subway line.
(The official cost estimate for the #7 has been “about $2 billion” for
years now, and that only includes a single new station at 34th and 11th.)

Even if the MTA ultimately agrees to take this on, it could set up a
potential conflict with the city down the road. The city council has
agreed to front about $1 billion in bond payments from the city’s
operating budget, with the assumption that the new train line, and those
PILOT-paying skyscrapers, will be in place by 2012. If the deadline slips–not unthinkable when you consider it took the MTA twelve years and $645 million to build the last 1,500 feet of tunnel connecting the 63rd Street tunnel to Queens–so does the PILOT schedule, which could lead to a
scenario where the city was pushing for a quick completion, while the MTA
balked at paying rush charges on a project that would earn it no revenues.

All of which makes it all the more interesting that Mayor Bloomberg chose
this week to declare that he’ll call
off the whole #7 train deal unless the MTA agrees to sell part of the
rail yard development rights to the city for $500 million, which the
agency sees as a bargain price. “Sell me land for a discount, or else I’ll
kill this project that I forced down your throat in the first place”? Gee,
is that a promise or a threat?