About That Faulty Intelligence


Editor’s note: If this business about the faulty intelligence before the Iraq war does end up finally swamping President Bush—and we’re by no means saying that will happen—then it will have been one of the slowest-moving waves in recent political history.

Lawmakers on the both sides of the aisle are now suggesting that Congress should do a little homework before sending a president off to invade another country. From the Washington Post comes this:

“I think a lot of us would really stop and think a moment before we would ever vote for war or to go and take military action,” Sen. Pat Roberts (Kan.) said on “Fox News Sunday.”

“We don’t accept this intelligence at face value anymore,” he added.

Way back in June 2005, Representative John Conyers of Michigan held a hearing on Capitol Hill for the purpose of considering the Downing Street Memo. That memo, with its notes from a British cabinet meeting, suggested that the Bush administration cook the intelligence before going to war in Iraq. The meetings’ minutes became big news on that side of the pond.

As the U.S. Congress begins to entertain its own doubts about the rationale for the Iraq war, it’s worth remembering the Downing Street Memo.

What’s the Deal With the Downing Street Memo?

Getting a grip on that Bush/Blair war scandal

By Patrick Mulvaney

A group of congressional Democrats held a public forum Thursday in the Capitol to investigate the so-called Downing Street Memo—an account of a British leadership meeting that suggests the Bush administration lied about its intentions and manipulated evidence in the run-up to the war in Iraq. Lawmakers gathered testimony from several witnesses, including former intelligence officials, with the hope of gaining a better understanding of the key decisions that preceded the 2003 invasion.

Representative John Conyers of Michigan, the ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, called the Bush administration to task for deceiving the American public during the march to war. The president’s statements in the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq contradict the accounts of British intelligence officials as detailed in the Memo, Conyers said. “The veracity of those statements has—to put it mildly—come into question,” he told the assembly.

The Memo has been big, big news in Britain, but had, at least until Thursday, received little attention in the U.S. What follows is a primer on the Memo and its implications.

On July 23, 2002, British prime minister Tony Blair met with several of his top advisers to discuss plans for the future concerning the United States, Iraq, and the United Nations. The minutes from that meeting were marked “secret and strictly confidential.” But on May 1, in the heat of Blair’s campaign for re-election, those minutes—which have come to be known as the Downing Street Memo—surfaced in The Times of London.

The Memo confirmed what many progressives had long suspected: that the Bush administration first decided to start a war in Iraq and then rigged a case to justify it. According to the Memo, Britain’s intelligence chief reported the following assessment with regard to his then recent trip to Washington: “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”

The British media, from the Guardian to the BBC News, quickly explored the Memo and its implications and subsequently unearthed more documents that cast further doubt on the official Bush-Blair version of the run-up to the war (as well as the preparations for its aftermath). In the meantime, however, the titans of the U.S. press largely dodged the Downing Street bullet. As Media Matters for America noted in a study released June 15, the editorial pages of four of the nation’s five largest newspapers—USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times—remained “conspicuously silent about the controversy surrounding the document” in the first six weeks after its publication.

Nonetheless, reactions to the Memo have slowly and quietly gathered steam across the United States. Progressive media outlets including The Village Voice (The Bush Beat, Power Plays),, Democracy Now!, and The Nation have covered the story on a regular basis, and smaller newspapers from Tennessee to Wisconsin have also taken up the issue. As for blogs, Daily Kos launched a campaign to “lift the virtual news blackout” on the story.

On the advocacy front, more than 500,000 people signed a letter to President Bush earlier this month demanding an explanation for the latest revelations, and groups of veterans and peace activists have formed a coalition to push for a formal congressional investigation. Moreover, Ralph Nader and Kevin Zeese, among others, have actually raised the prospect of impeachment for President Bush.

With the issue clearly gaining momentum, the key question now is whether the Memo has the muscle to sway not only those who opposed the war in the first place, but also those who at some point supported it.

Neither testimony from Joseph Wilson and Richard Clarke nor the enduring absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has unsettled the American public enough to reopen the debate over the war. Controversy with regard to the Downing Street Memo may also wither away.

But there is a real possibility the issue could gain serious traction in the days and weeks ahead. The people of the United States have become increasingly frustrated with the Iraq war; a recent Washington Post poll found that for the first time since major combat operations began in March 2003, more than half of all Americans feel the war has not made the nation safer. And perhaps even more importantly, the Memo is strikingly concrete; beyond its commentary on intelligence-fiddling and fact-tweaking, it notes quite plainly that “the case was thin” for military intervention in Iraq.